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    The Rabocheye Dyelo's assertions -- which we have analyzed above -- that the economic struggle is the most widely applicable means of political agitation and that our task now is to lend the economic struggle itself a political character, etc., express a narrow view not only of our political, but also of our organi~ational tasks. The "economic struggle against the employers and the government" does not in the least re quire -- and therefore such a struggle can never give rise to -- an all-Russian centralized organization that will combine, in one general onslaught, all and every manifestation of political opposition, protest and indignation, an organization that will consist of professional revolutionaries and be led by the real political leaders of the whole people. This is but natural. The character of any organization is naturally and inevitably determined by the content of its activity. Consequently, the Rabocheye Dyelo, by the assertions analyzed above, sanctifies and legitimatizes not only the narrowness of political activity, but also the narrowness of organization al work. In this case too, as always, it is an organ whose consciousness yields to spontaneity. And yet the worship of spontaneously developing forms of organization, failure to realize how narrow and primitive is our organizational work, what amateurs we still are in this most important sphere, failure to realize this, I say, is a veritable disorder from which our movement suffers. It is not a disorder that comes with decline, it is, of course, a disorder that comes with growth. But it is precisely at the present time, when the wave of spontaneous indignation, as it were, sweeps over us, leaders and organizers of the movement, that a most ir reconcilable struggle must be waged against all defence of backwardness, against any legitimization of narrowness in this matter, and it is particularly necessary to rouse in all who take part in practical work, in all who are preparing to take up their work, discontent with the amateurishness that prevails among us and an unshakable determination to get rid of it.

    We shall try to answer this question by giving a brief description of the activity of a typical Social-Democratic circle of the period of 1894-1901. We have already noted that the entire student youth of the period was absorbed in Marxism. Of course, these students were not only, or even not so much, absorbed in Marxism as a theory, but as an answer to the question: "What is to be done?"; as a call to take the field against the enemy. And these new warriors marched to battle

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with astonishingly primitive equipment and training. In a vast number of cases, they had almost no equipment and absolutely no training. They marched to war like peasants from the plough, armed only with clubs. A students' circle, having no contacts whatever with the old members of the movement, no contacts with circles in other districts, or even in other parts of the same city (or with other universities), without the various sections of the revolutionary work being in any way organized, having no systematic plan of activity covering any length of time, establishes contacts with the workers and sets to work. The circle gradually expansds its propaganda and agitation; by its activities it wins the sympathies of rather large sections of workers and of a certain section of the educated classes, which provide it with money and from among whom the "committee" recruits new groups of young people. There is a growing fascination about the committee (or League of Struggle), its sphere of activity becomes wider and its activities expand quite spontaneously: the very people who a year or a few months previously had spoken at the gatherings of the students' circle and discussed the question, "Whither?", who established and maintained contacts with the workers, wrote and published leaflets, now establish contacts with other groups of revolutionaries, procure literature, set to work to publish a local newspaper, begin to talk about organizing a demonstration, and finally, commence open hostilities (these open hostilities may, according to circumstances, take the form of the publication of the very first agitational leaflet, or the first issue of a newspaper, or of the organization of the first demonstration). And usually the very first of these actions ends in immediate and wholesale arrests. Immediate and wholesale, precisely because these

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open hostilities were not the result of a systematic and carefully thought-out and gradually prepared plan for a prolonged and stubborn struggle, but simply the result of the spontaneous growth of traditional circle work; because, naturally, the police, in almost every case, knew the principal leaders of the local movement, for they had already "won a reputation" for themselves in their school days, and the police waited only for a convenient moment to make their raid, deliberately allowing the circle sufficient time to develop its work so that they might obtain a palpable corpus delicti, and always permitted several of the persons known to them to remain at liberty in order to act as "breeders" (which, I believe, is the technical term used both by our people and by the gendarmes). One cannot help comparing this kind of warfare with that conducted by a mob of peasants, armed with clubs, against modern troops. And one can only wonder at the virility of the movement which expanded, grew and scored victories in spite of the total lack of training among the fighters. It is true that from the historical point of view, the primitiveness of equipment was not only inevitable at first, but even legitimate as one of the conditions for the wide recruiting of fighters, but as soon as serious war operations commenced (and they commenced in fact with the strikes in the summer of 1896), the defects in our fighting organizations made themselves felt to an ever-increasing degree. Thrown into confusion at first and committing a number of mistakes (for example, its appeal to the public describing the misdeeds of the Socialists, or the deportation of workers from the capital to provincial industrial centres), the government very soon adapted itself to the new conditions of the struggle and managed to deploy its perfectly equipped detachments of

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agents provocateurs, spies and gendarmes. Raids became so frequent, affected such a vast number of people and cleared out the local circles so thoroughly that the masses of the workers literally lost all their leaders, the movement assumed an incredibly sporadic character, and it became utterly impossible to establish continuity and coherence in the work. The terrible dispersion of the local leaders, the accidental character of the circle memberships, the lack of training in and the narrow outlook on theoretical, political, and organizational questions were all the inevitable result of the conditions described above. Things reached such a pass that in several places the workers, because of our lack of stamina and ability to maintain secrecy, began to lose faith in the intelligentsia and to avoid them; the intellectuals, they said, are much too careless and lay themselves open to police raids!

    Anyone who has the slightest knowledge of the movement is aware that all thinking Social-Democrats have at last begun to regard these primitive methods as a disease. And in order that the reader who is not acquainted with the movement may have no grounds for thinking that we are "inventing" a special stage or special disease of the movement, we shall refer once again to the witness we have already quoted. We hope we shall be forgiven for the length of the quotation:

    "While the gradual transition to more extensive practical activity," writes B-v in the Rabocheye Dyelo, No. 6, "a transition which is directly dependent on the general transitional period through which the Russian working-class movement is now passing, is a characteristic feature . . . there is, however, another and not less interesting feature in the general mechanism of the Russian workers' revolution. We refer to the general lack of revolutionary forces fit for action* which is felt not only in St. Petersburg, but throughout the whole of Russia. With the

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    We must now deal with a question that has undoubtedly arisen in the mind of every reader. Can a connection be established between amateurishness, this disorder of growth affecting the whole of the movement, and Economism, which is one of the trends in Russian Social-Democracy? We think that it can. Lack of practical training, lack of ability to carry on organizational work is certainly common to us all, including those who have from the very outset unswervingly stood for revolutionary Marxism. And, of course, were it only lack of practical training, no one could blame the practical workers. But the term "amateurishness" embraces something else: it denotes a narrow scope of revolutionary work generally, failure to understand that a good organization of revolutionaries cannot be built up on the basis of such narrow activity, and lastly -- and most important -- it denotes attempts to justify this narrowness and to elevate it to a special "theory," i.e., bowing in worship to spontaneity on this question too. Once such attempts were observed, it became certain that amateurishness is connected with Economism and that we shall never eliminate this narrowness of our organizational activity until we eliminate Economism generally (i.e., the narrow conception of Marxist theory, of the role of Social-Democracy and of its political tasks). And these attempts were revealed in a twofold direction. Some began to say: the mass of workers themselves have not yet advanced the broad and militant political tasks that the revolutionaries are attempting to "impose" upon them; they must continue, for the time being, to fight for immediate political demands, to conduct "the economic struggle against the employers

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    It is only natural to expect that a Social-Democrat, who conceives the political struggle as being identical with the "economic struggle against the employers and the government," should conceive of an "organization of revolutionaries" as being more or less identical with an "organization of workers." And this, in fact, is what actually happens; so that when we talk about organization, we literally talk in different tongues. I vividly recall, for example, a conversation I once had with a fairly consistent Economist, with whom I had not been previously acquainted. We were discussing the pamphlet Who Will Bring About the Political Revolution? and we were very soon agreed that its principal defect was that it ignored the question of organization. We were beginning to think that we were in complete agreement with each other -- but . . . as the conversation proceeded, it became clear that we were talking of different things. My interlocutor accused the author of ignoring strike funds, mutual aid societies, etc., whereas I had in mind an organization of revolutionaries as an essential factor in "bringing about" the political revolution. As soon as that disagreement became clear, I hardly remember a single question of principle upon which I was in agreement with that Economist! What was the source of our disagreement? It was the fact that on questions of both organization and politics the

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Economists are forever lapsing from Social-Democracy into trade unionism. The political struggle of Social-Democracy is far more extensive and complex than the economic struggle of the workers against the employers and the government. Similarly (and indeed for that reason), the organization of a revolutionary Social-Democratic party must inevitably be of a different kind than the organizations of the workers designed for this struggle. A workers' organization must in the first place be a trade organization; secondly, it must be as broad as possible; and thirdly, it must be as little clandestine as possible (here, and further on, of course, I have only autocratic Russia in mind). On the other hand, the organizations of revolutionaries must consist first, foremost and mainly of people who make revolutionary activity their profession (that is why I speak of organizations of revolutionaries, meaning revolutionary Social-Democrats). In view of this common feature of the members of such an organization, all distinctions as between workers and intellectuals, and certainly distinctions of trade and profession, must be utterly obliterated. Such an organization must of necessity be not too extensive and as secret as possible. Let us examine this threefold distinction.

    In countries where political liberty exists the distinction between a trade union and a political organization is clear enough, as is the distinction between trade unions and Social-Democracy. The relation of the latter to the former will naturally vary in each country according to historical, legal and other conditions -- it may be more or less close, complex, etc. (in our opinion it should be as close and simple as possible); but there can be no question of trade union organizations being identical with the Social-Democratic party

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organizations in free countries. In Russia, however, the yoke of the autocracy appears at first glance to obliterate all distinctions between a Social-Democratic organization and trade unions, because all workers' associations and all circles are prohibited, and because the principal manifestation and weapon of the workers' economic struggle -- the strike -- is regarded as a criminal (and sometimes even as a political!) offence. Conditions in our country, therefore, on the one hand, strongly "impel" the workers engaged in economic struggle to concern themselves with political questions, and, on the other, they "impel" Social-Democrats to confuse trade unionism with Social-Democracy (and our Krichevskys, Martynovs and their like, while diligently discussing the first kind of "impelling," fail to notice the second kind). Indeed, picture to yourselves people who are immersed ninety-nine per cent in "the economic struggle against the employers and the government." Some of them will never, during the whole course of their activity (four to six months) be impelled to think of the need for a more complex organization of revolutionaries; others, perhaps, will come across the fairly widely distributed Bernsteinian literature, from which they will become convinced of the profound importance of the forward march of "the drab everyday struggle." Still others will be carried away, perhaps, by the seductive idea of showing the world a new example of "close and organic contact with the proletarian struggle" -- contact between the trade union and Social-Democratic movements. Such people may argue that the later a country enters into the arena of capitalism and, consequently, of the working-class movement, the more the Socialists in that country may take part in, and support, the trade union movement, and the less reason can

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and should there be for non-Social-Democratic trade unions. Up to this point the argument is quite correct; unfortunately, however, some go beyond that and envisage the complete fusion of Social-Democracy with trade unionism. We shall soon see, from the example of the Rules of the St. Petersburg League of Struggle, what a harmful effect these dreams have upon our plans of organization.

    The workers' organizations for the economic struggle should be trade union organizations. Every Social-Democratic worker should as far as possible assist and actively work in these organizations. That is true. But it is not at all to our interest to demand that only Social-Democrats should be eligible for membership in the "trade" unions: that would only narrow down our influence over the masses. Let every worker who understands the need to unite for the struggle against the employers and the government join the trade unions. The very aim of the trade unions would be unattainable if they failed to unite all who have attained at least this elementary degree of understanding, and if they were not very wide organizations. And the wider these organizations are, the wider our influence over them will be -- an influence due not only to the "spontaneous" development of the economic struggle but also to the direct and conscious effort of the socialist trade union members to influence their comrades. But a broad organization cannot apply the methods of strict secrecy (since the latter demands far greater training than is required for the economic struggle). How is the contradiction between the need for a large membership and the need for strictly secret methods to be reconciled? How are we to make the trade unions as little clandestine as possible? Generally speaking, there can be only two ways to this end:

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in the "Rules for a Trade Union Workers' Organization," of October 1900 (special leaflet printed in St. Petersburg and quoted in the Iskra, No. 1). The fundamental defect of both these sets of rules is that they give a detailed formulation of a broad workers' organization and confuse it with an organization of revolutionaries. Let us take the last-mentioned set of rules, since it is drawn up in greater detail. The body of it consists of fifty-two paragraphs. Twenty-three paragraphs deal with structure, the method of conducting business and the jurisdiction of the "workers' circles," which are to be organized in every factory ("not more than ten persons") and which elect "central (factory) groups." "The central group," says paragraph 2, "observes all that goes on in its factory or workshop and keeps a record of events." "The central group presents to subscribers a monthly financial account" (par. 17), etc. Ten paragraphs are devoted to the "district organization," and nineteen to the highly complex interconnection between the "Committee of the Workers' Organization" and the "Committee of the St. Petersburg League of Struggle" (delegates from each district and from the "executive groups" -- "groups of propagandists, groups for maintaining contact with the provinces and with the organization abroad, groups for managing stores, publications and funds").

    Social-Democracy= "executive groups" in relation to the economic struggle of the workers! It would be difficult to find a more striking illustration of how the Economists' ideas deviate from Social-Democracy to trade unionism, and how alien to them is any idea that a Social-Democrat must concern himself first and foremost with an organization of revolutionaries who are capable of guiding the whole proletarian struggle for emancipation. To talk of "the political emancipation of the working class" and of the struggle against "tsarist

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despotism," and yet to draft rules like this, indicates a complete failure to understand what the real political tasks of Social-Democracy are. Not one of the fifty or so paragraphs reveals the slightest glimmer of understanding that it is necessary to conduct the widest possible political agitation among the masses, an agitation that deals with every aspect of Russian absolutism and with all the features of the various social classes in Russia. Rules like these are of no use even for the achievement of trade union aims, let alone political aims, for that requires organization according to trades, of which no mention is made in the Rules.

    But most characteristic of all, perhaps, is the amazing top-heaviness of the whole "system," which attempts to bind each single factory with the "committee" by a permanent string of uniform and ludicrously petty rules and a three-stage system of election. Hemmed in by the narrow outlook of Economism, the mind is lost in details which positively reek of red tape and bureaucracy. In practice, of course, three-fourths of the clauses are never applied; on the other hand, however, a "conspiratorial" organization of this kind, with its central group in each factory, makes it very easy for the gendarmes to carry out raids on a vast scale. The Polish comrades have already passed through a similar phase in their movement, when everybody was enthusiastic about the extensive organization of workers' benefit funds; but they very quickly abandoned this idea when they saw that such organizations only provided rich harvests for the gendarmes. If we are out for wide workers' organizations, and not for widespread arrests, if we do not want to provide satisfaction to the gendarmes, we must aim to have these organizations remain entirely informal. But will they be able to function in that case? Well, let us see what the functions are: ". . . to observe all that goes on in the

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factory and keep a record of events." (Par. 2 of the Rules.) Do we really require a formal group for this? Could not the purpose be better served by correspondence to the illegal papers and without setting up special groups? ". . . To lead the struggles of the workers for the improvement of their workshop conditions." (Par. 3 of the Rules.) This, too, requires no formal group. Any sensible agitator can establish just what demands the workers want to advance in the course of ordinary conversation and transmit them to a narrow -- not a wide -- organization of revolutionaries to be embodied in a leaflet. ". . . To organize a fund . . . to which subscriptions of two kopeks per ruble should be made" (par. 9) . . . to present to subscribers a monthly financial account (par. 17) . . . to expel members who fail to pay dues (par. 10), and so forth. Why, this is a very paradise for the police; for nothing would be easier than for them to penetrate into the ponderous secrecy of a "central factory fund," confiscate the money and arrest all the best people. Would it not be simpler to issue one-kopek or two-kopek coupons bearing the official stamp of a well-known (very exclusive and very secret) organization, or to make collections without coupons of any kind and to print reports in a certain agreed code in an illegal paper? The object would thereby be attained, but it would be a hundred times more difficult for the gendarmes to pick up clues.

    I could go on analyzing the Rules, but I think that what has been said will suffice. A small, compact core of the most reliable, experienced and hardened workers, with responsible representatives in the principal districts and connected by all the rules of strict secrecy with the organization of revolutionaries, can, with the widest support of the masses and without any formal organization, perform all the functions of

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a trade union organization, and perform them, moreover, in a manner desirable to Social-Democracy. Only in this way can we secure the consolidation and development of a Social-Democratic trade union movement, in spite of all the gendarmes.

    It may be objected that an organization which is so loose that it is not even definitely formed, and which even has no enrolled and registered membership, cannot be called an organization at all. That may very well be. I am not out for names. But this "organization without members" will do everything that is required, and from the very outset guarantee the closest contact between our future trade unions and Socialism. Only an incorrigible utopian would want a broad organization of workers, with elections, reports, universal suffrage, etc., under the autocracy.

    The moral to be drawn from this is a simple one: if we begin with the solid foundation of a strong organization of revolutionaries, we can guarantee the stability of the movement as a whole and carry out the aims of both Social-Democracy and of trade unions proper. If, however, we begin with a broad workers' organization, supposed to be most "accessible" to the masses (but as a matter of fact most accessible to the gendarmes and making the revolutionaries most accessible to the police), we shall achieve neither one nor the other of these aims; we shall not eliminate our amateurishness, and because we remain scattered and our forces are constantly broken up by the police, we shall only make the trade unions of the Zubatov and Ozerov type most accessible to the masses.

    What, properly speaking, should be the functions of an organization of revolutionaries? We shall deal with this in detail. But first let us examine a very typical argument advanced by our terrorist, who (sad fate!) in this matter also is a next-

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door neighbour to the Economist. The Svoboda (No. 1), a journal published for workers, contains an article entitled "Organization," the author of which tries to defend his friends, the Economist workers of Ivanovo-Voznesensk. He writes:

    "It is a bad thing when the crowd is mute and unenlightened, and when the movement does not proceed from the rank and file. For instance, the students of a university town leave for their homes during the summer and other vacations and immediately the workers' movement comes to a standstill. Can a workers' movement which has to be pushed on from outside be a real force? Of course not! . . . It has not yet learned to walk, it is still in leading strings. So it is in everything. The students go off, and everything comes to a standstill. The most capable among the cream are arrested -- the milk turns sour. If the 'committee' is arrested, everything comes to a standstill until a new one can be formed. And one never knows what sort of committee will be set up next -- it may be nothing like the former one. The first preached one thing, the second may preach the very opposite. Continuity between yesterday and tomorrow is broken, the experience of the past does not serve as a guide for the future. And all this is because no deep roots have been struck in the crowd; the work is carried on not by a hundred fools, but by a dozen wise men. A dozen wise men can be wiped out at a snap, but when the organization embraces the crowd everything proceeds from the crowd, and nobody, however he tries, can stop the cause." (P. 63.)

    The facts are described correctly. They provide a fairly good picture of our amateurishness. But the conclusions are worthy of the Rabochaya Mysl both for their stupidity and their lack of political tact. They represent the height of stupidity, because the author confuses the philosophical and social-historical question of the "depth" of the "roots" of the movement with the technical and organizational question of the best method of fighting the gendarmes. They represent the height of political tactlessness, because the author, instead of appealing from bad leaders to good leaders, appeals from

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organization of leaders that maintains continuity; 2) that the wider the masses spontaneously drawn into the struggle, forming the basis of the movement and participating in it, the more urgent the need of such an organization, and the more solid this organization must be (for it is much easier for demagogues to sidetrack the more backward sections of the masses); 3) that such an organization must consist chiefly of people professionally engaged in revolutionary activity; 4) that in an autocratic state, the more we confine the membership of such an organization to people who are professionally engaged in revolutionary activity and who have been professionally trained in the art of combating the political police, the more difficult will it be to wipe out such an organization, and 5) the greater will be the number of people of the working class and of the other classes of society who will be able to join the movement and perform active work in it.

    I invite our Economists, terrorists and "Economists-terrorists"* to confute these propositions. At the moment, I shall deal only with the last two points. The question as to whether it is easier to wipe out "a dozen wise men" or "a hundred fools" reduces itself to the question we have considered above,

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namely, whether it is possible to have a mass organization when the maintenance of strict secrecy is essential. We can never give a mass organization that degree of secrecy without which there can be no question of persistent and continuous struggle against the government. But to concentrate all secret functions in the hands of as small a number of professional revolutionaries as possible does not mean that the latter will "do the thinking for all" and that the crowd will not take an active part in the movement. On the contrary, the crowd will advance from its ranks increasing numbers of professional revolutionaries; for it will know that it is not enough for a few students and for a few workingmen waging the economic struggle, to gather together and form a "committee," but that it takes years to train oneself to be a professional revolutionary; the crowd will "think" not of amateurish methods alone but of such training. The centralization of the secret functions of the organization by no means implies the centralization of all the functions of the movement. The active participation of the widest mass in the illegal press will not diminish because a "dozen" professional revolutionaries centralize the secret functions connected with this work; on the contrary, it will increase tenfold. In this way, and in this way alone, will we ensure that reading of illegal literature, writing for it, and to some extent even distributing it, will almost cease to be secret work, for the police will soon come to realize the folly and futility of setting the whole judicial and administrative machine into motion to intercept every copy of publication that is being broadcast in thousands. This applies not only to the press, but to every function of the movement, even to demonstrations. The active and widespread participation of the masses will not suffer; on the contrary, it will benefit by the fact that a "dozen" experienced

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revolutionaries, trained professionally no less than the police, will centralize all the secret aspects of the work -- drawing up leaflets, working out approximate plans and appointing bodies of leaders for each urban district, for each factory district and for each educational institution, etc. (I know that exception will be taken to my "undemocratic" views, but I shall reply fully to this anything but intelligent objection later on.) The centralization of the most secret functions in an organization of revolutionaries will not diminish, but rather increase the extent and quality of the activity of a large number of other organizations which are intended for a broad public and are therefore as loose and as non-secret as possible, such as workers' trade unions, workers' self-education circles and circles for reading illegal literature, socialist and also democratic circles among all other sections of the population, etc., etc. We must have such circles, trade unions and organizations everywhere in as large a number as possible and with the widest variety of functions; but it would be absurd and dangerous to confuse them with the organization of revolutionaries, to obliterate the border line between them, to dim still more the masses' already incredibly hazy appreciation of the fact that in order to "serve" the mass movement we must have people who will devote themselves exclusively to Social-Democratic activities, and that such people must train themselves patiently and steadfastly to be professional revolutionaries.

    Yes, this appreciation has become incredibly dim. Our chief sin with regard to organization is that by our amateurishness we have lowered the prestige of revolutionaries in Russia. A person who is flabby and shaky in questions of theory, who has a narrow outlook, who pleads the spontaneity of the masses as an excuse for his own sluggishness, who resembles

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    We have already heard from B-v about "the lack of revolutionary forces fit for action which is felt not only in St. Petersburg, but throughout the whole of Russia." Hardly anyone will dispute this fact. But the question is, how is it to be explained? B-v writes:

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    "We shall not go into an explanation of the historical causes of this phenomenon; we shall merely state that a society, demoralized by prolonged political reaction and split by past and present economic changes, advances from its own ranks an extremely small number of persons fit for revolutionary work; that the working class does advance revolutionary workers who to some extent reinforce the ranks of the illegal organizations, but that the number of such revolutionaries is inadequate to meet the requirements of the times. This is all the more so because the worker who spends eleven and a half hours a day in the factory is in such a position that he can perform, mainly, the functions of an agitator; but propaganda and organization, delivery and reproduction of illegal literature, issuing leaflets, etc., are duties which must necessarily fall mainly upon the shoulders of an extremely small force of intellectuals." (Rabocheye Dyelo, No. 6, pp. 38-39.)

    On many points we disagree with B-v, particularly with the words we have emphasized, and which bring out most saliently that, although weary of our amateurishness (as is every practical worker who thinks over the position), B-v cannot find the way out of this intolerable situation, because he is ground down by Economism. The fact of the matter is that society advances very many persons fit for "work," but we are unable to make use of them all. The critical, transitional state of our movement in this respect may be formulated as follows: there are no people -- yet there is a mass of people. There is a mass of people, because the working class and ever more diverse strata of society, year after year, advance from their ranks an increasing number of discontented people who desire to protest, who are ready to render all the assistance they can in the fight against absolutism, the intolerableness of which is not yet recognized by all, but is nevertheless more and more acutely sensed by increasing masses of the people. At the same time we have no people, because we have no leaders, no political leaders, no talented organizers capable of arranging extensive and at the same time uniform and harmonious work that would employ all forces, even the most in-

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imbue not only one's own army with confidence in its strength, but it is important also to convince the enemy and all neutral elements of this strength; friendly neutrality may sometimes decide the issue. If such an organization existed, one built up on a firm theoretical foundation and possessing a Social-Democratic journal, we would have no reason to fear that the movement might be diverted from its path by the numerous "outside" elements that are attracted to it. (On the contrary, it is precisely at the present time, with amateurishness prevalent, that we see many Social-Democrats leaning towards the Credo, and only imagining that they are Social-Democrats.) In a word, specialization necessarily presupposes centralization, and in its turn imperatively calls for it.

    But B-v himself, who has so excellently described the necessity for specialization, underestimates its importance, in our opinion, in the second part of the argument that we have quoted. The number of working-class revolutionaries is inadequate, he says. This is perfectly true, and once again we stress that the "valuable communication of a close observer" fully confirms our view of the causes of the present crisis in Social-Democracy, and, consequently, of the means required for overcoming it. Not only are revolutionaries in general lagging behind the spontaneous awakening of the masses, but even working-class revolutionaries are lagging behind the spontaneous awakening of the working-class masses. And this fact most strikingly confirms, even from the "practical" point of view, not only the absurdity but even the political reactionariness of the "pedagogics" to which we are so often treated when discussing our duties to our workers. This fact proves that our very first and most imperative duty is to help to train working-class revolutionaries who will be

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on the same level in regard to Party activity as the revolutionaries from amongst the intellectuals (we emphasize the words "in regard to Party activity," because although necessary, it is neither so easy nor so imperative to bring the workers up to the level of intellectuals in other respects). Therefore, attention must be devoted principally to raising the workers to the level of revolutionaries; it is not at all our task to descend to the level of the "working masses" as the Economists wish to do, or to the level of the "average worker," as the Svoboda desires to do (which thus ascends to the second grade of Economist "pedagogics"). I am far from denying the necessity for popular literature for the workers, and especially popular (but, of course, not vulgar) literature for the especially backward workers. But what annoys me is this constant confusion of pedagogics with questions of politics and organization. You, gentlemen, who are so much concerned about the "average worker," as a matter of fact, rather insult the workers by your desire to talk down to them when discussing working-class politics and working-class organization. Talk about serious things in a serious manner, leave pedagogics to the pedagogues, and not to politicians, nor to organizers! Are there not advanced people, "average people," and the "mass," among the intelligentsia too? Does not everyone recognize that popular literature is also required for the intelligentsia and is not such literature written? Just imagine someone, in an article on organizing college or high-school students, repeating over and over again, as if he had made a new discovery, that first of all we must have an organization of "average students." The author of such an article would be ridiculed, and rightly so. He would be told: give us your ideas on organization, if you have any, and we ourselves will decide who is "aver-

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waste our strength in a positively shameful manner; we lack the ability to husband that which should be tended and reared with special care. Look at the Germans: they have a hundred times more forces than we have. But they understand perfectly well that the "average" does not too frequently promote really capable agitators, etc., from its ranks. That is why they immediately try to place every capable workingman in such conditions as will enable him to develop and apply his abilities to the utmost: he is made a professional agitator, he is encouraged to widen the held of his activity, to spread it from one factory to the whole of the industry, from one locality to the whole country. He acquires experience and dexterity in his profession, he broadens his outlook and increases his knowledge, he observes at close quarters the prominent political leaders from other localities and of other parties, he strives to rise to their level and combine within himself the knowledge of working-class environment and freshness of socialist convictions with professional skill, without which the proletariat cannot wage a stubborn struggle against its excellently trained enemies. In this way and in this way alone does the mass of workers produce men like Bebel and Auer. But what in a politically free country takes place very largely automatically must in Russia be done deliberately and systematically by our organizations. A worker-agitator who is at all talented and "promising" must not be left to work eleven hours a day in a factory. We must arrange that he be maintained by the Party, that he may go underground in good time, that he change the place of his activity, otherwise he will not enlarge his experience, he will not widen his outlook, and will not be able to hold out for at least a few years in the fight against the gendarmes. As the spontaneous rise of the working-class

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masses becomes wider and deeper, they promote from their ranks not only an increasing number of talented agitators, but also talented organizers, propagandists and "practical workers" in the best sense of the term (of whom there are so few among our intelligentsia who, for the most part, in the Russian manner, are somewhat careless and sluggish in their habits). When we have detachments of specially trained worker-revolutionaries who have gone through extensive preparation (and, of course, revolutionaries "of all arms"), no political police in the world will then be able to contend against them, for these detachments of men absolutely devoted to the revolution will themselves enjoy the absolute confidence of the widest masses of the workers. And we are directly to blame for doing too little to "stimulate" the workers to take this path, common to them and to the "intellectuals," of professional revolutionary training, and that we too frequently drag them back by our silly speeches about what "can be understood" by the masses of the workers, by the "average workers," etc.

    In this, as in other respects, the narrow scope of our organizational work is without a doubt directly due to the fact (although the overwhelming majority of the "Economists" and the novices in practical work do not appreciate it) that we restrict our theories and our political tasks to a narrow field. Worship of spontaneity seems to inspire a fear of taking even one step away from what "can be understood" by the masses, a fear of rising too high above mere subservience to the immediate and direct requirements of the masses. Have no fear, gentlemen! Remember that we stand so low on the plane of organization that the very idea that we could rise too high is absurd!

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    And yet there are many people among us who are so sensitive to the "voice of life" that they fear it more than anything in the world and accuse those who adhere to the views here expounded of Narodnaya Volya-ism, of failing to understand "democracy," etc. We have to deal with these accusations, which, of course, have been echoed by the Rabocheye Dyelo.

    The writer of these lines knows very well that the St. Petersburg Economists even accused the Rabochaya Gazeta of being Narodnaya Volya-ite (which is quite understandable when one compares it with the Rabochaya Mysl ). We were not in the least surprised, therefore, when, soon after the appearance of the Iskra, a comrade informed us that the Social-Democrats in the town of X describe the Iskra as a Narodnaya Volya-ite journal. We, of course, were flattered by this accusation, for what decent Social-Democrat has not been accused by the Economists of being a Narodnaya Volya-ite?

    These acusations are the result of a twofold misunderstanding. First the history of the revolutionary movement is so little known among us that the name "Narodnaya Volya" is used to denote any idea of a militant centraiized organization which declares determined war upon tsarism. But the magnificent organization that the revolutionaries had in the 'seventies, and which should serve us as a model, was not established by the Narodnaya Volya-ites, but by the Zemlya i Volya-ites, who split up into the Cherny Peredel and Narodnaya Volya. Consequently, to regard a militant revolutionary organization as something specifically Narod-

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naya Volya-ite is absurd both historically and logically, because no revolutionary tendency, if it seriously thinks of fighting, can dispense with such an organization. The mistake the Narodnaya Volya-ites committed was not that they strove to enlist in their organization all the discontented, and to direct this organization to decisive battle against the autocracy; on the contrary, that was their great historical merit. Their mistake was that they relied on a theory which in substance was not a revolutionary at all, and they either did not know how, or were unable, inseparably to link up their movement with the class struggle within developing capitalist society. And only a gross failure to understand Marxism (or an "understanding" of it in the spirit of Struve-ism) could prompt the opinion that the rise of a mass, spontaneous working-class movement relieves us of the duty of creating as good an organization of revolution aries as the Zemlya i Volya had, and even an incomparably better one. On the contrary, this movement imposes this duty upon us, because the spontaneous struggle of the proletariat will not become its genuine "class struggle" until this struggle is led by a strong organization of revolutionaries.

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sity is centralized, may too easily rush into a premature attack, may thoughtlessly intensify the movement before the growth of political discontent, the intensity of the ferment and anger of the working class, etc., have made such an attack possible and necessary. To this we reply: speaking abstractly, it cannot be denied, of course, that a militant organization may thoughtlessly commence a battle, which may end in defeat, that might have been avoided under other circumstances. But we cannot confine ourselves to abstract reasoning on such a question, because every battle bears within itself the abstract possibility of defeat, and there is no other way of reducing this possibility than by organized preparation for battle. If, however, we proceed from the concrete conditions at present prevailing in Russia, we must come to the positive conclusion that a strong revolutionary organization is absolutely necessary precisely for the purpose of giving firmness to the movement, and of safeguarding it against the possibility of making premature attacks. It is precisely at the present time, when no such organization exists yet, and when the revolutionary movement is rapidly and spontaneously growing, that we already observe two opposite extremes (which, as is to be expected, "meet"), i.e., absolutely unsound Economism and the preaching of moderation, and equally unsound "excitative terror," which "strives artificially to call forth symptoms of its end in a movement which is developing and becoming strong, but which is as yet nearer to its beginning than to its end." (V. Zasulich, in the Zarya, No. 2-3, p. 353.) And the example of the Rabocheye Dyelo shows that there are already Social-Democrats who give way to both these extremes. This is not surprising because, apart from other reasons, the "economic struggle against the employers and the government" can never satisfy

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revolutionaries, and because opposite extremes will always arise here and there. Only a centralized, militant organization that consistently carries out a Social-Democratic policy, that satisfies, so to speak, all revolutionary instincts and strivings, can safeguard the movement against making thoughtless attacks and prepare attacks that hold out the promise of success.

    A further objection may be raised, viz., that the views on organization here expounded contradict the "principles of democracy." Now while the first-mentioned accusation was specifically Russian in origin, this one is specifically foreign in character. And only an organization abroad (the Union of Russian Social-Democrats) was capable of giving its editorial board instructions like the following:

    "Principles of Organization. In order to secure the successful development and unification of Social-Democracy, broad democratic principles of Party organization must be emphasized, developed and fought for; and this is particularly necessary in view of the antidemocratic tendencies that have become revealed in the ranks of our Party." (Two Congresses, p. 18.)

    We shall see in the next chapter how the Rabocheye Dyelo fights against the Iskra's "antidemocratic tendencies." For the present we shall examine more closely the "principle" that the Economists advance. Everyone will probably agree that "broad democratic principles" presuppose the two following conditions: first, full publicity, and second, election to all offices. It would be absurd to speak about democracy without publicity, that is, a publicity that is not limited to the membership of the organization. We call the German Socialist Party a democratic organization because all it does is done publicly; even its party congresses are held in public. But no one would call democratic an organization that is hidden from every one but its members by a veil of secrecy.

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What is the use, then, of advancing "broad democratic principles" when the fundamental condition for these principles cannot be fulfilled by a secret organization? "Broad principles" turns out to be a resonant but hollow phrase. More, it reveals a total lack of understanding of the urgent tasks in regard to organization. Everyone knows how great is the lack of secrecy among the "broad" masses of our revolutionaries. We have heard the bitter complaints of B-v on this score, and his absolutely just demand for a "strict selection of members." (Rabocheye Dyelo, No. 6, p. 42.) Yet, persons who boast a keen "sense of realities" urge, in a situation like this, not the strictest secrecy and the strictest (and therefore more restricted) selection of members but "broad democratic principles"! This is what we call being absolutely wide of the mark.

    Nor is the situation any better with regard to the second attribute of democracy, namely, the principle of election. In politically free countries, this condition is taken for granted. "Membership of the Party is open to those who accept the principles of the Party program and render the Party all possible support" -- reads clause I of the rules of the German Social-Democratic Party. And as the entire political arena is as open to the public view as is a theatre stage to the audience, this acceptance or non-acceptance, support or opposition, is known to all from the press and public meetings. Everyone knows that a certain political figure began in such and such a way, passed through such and such an evolution, behaved in a trying moment in such and such a way and possesses such and such qualities and, consequently, all party members, knowing all the facts, can elect or refuse to elect this person to a particular party office. The universal

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control (in the literal sense of the term) exercised over every act of a party man in the political field brings into existence an automatically operating mechanism which produces what in biology is called "survival of the fittest." The "natural selection" by full publicity, election and universal control provides the guarantee that, in the last analysis, every political figure will be "in his proper place," will do the work for which he is best fitted by his capacity and abilities, will feel the effects of his mistakes on himself, and will prove before all the world his ability to recognize mistakes and to avoid them.

    Just try to put this picture into the frame of our autocracy! Is it conceivable in Russia for all those "who accept the principles of the Party program and render the Party all possible support" to control every action of the revolutionary working in secret? Is it possible for all the revolutionaries to elect one of their number to any particular office, when, in the very interests of the work, he must conceal his identity from nine out of ten of these "all"? Ponder a little over the real meaning of the high-sounding phrases to which the Rabocheye Dyelo gives utterance, and you will realize that "broad democracy" in Party organization, amidst the gloom of the autocracy and the domination of gendarme selection, is nothing more than a useless and harmful toy. It is a useless toy because, as a matter of fact, no revolutionary organization has ever practised, or could practise, broad democracy, however much it desired to do so. It is a harmful toy because any attempt to practise the "broad democratic principles" will simply facilitate the work of the police in carrying out large-scale raids, it will perpetuate the prevailing amateurishness, divert the thoughts

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of the practical workers from the serious and imperative task of training themselves to become professional revolutionaries to that of drawing up detailed "paper" rules for election systems. Only abroad, where people who have no opportunity of doing real live work gather togethet very often, could this "playing at democracy" develop here and there, especially in various small groups.

    In order to show how implausible is the Rabocheye Dyelo's favourite trick of advancing the plausible "principle" of democracy in revolutionary affairs, we shall again call a witness. This witness, E. Serebryakov, the editor of the London magazine, Nakanunye, has a tender feeling for the Rabocheye Dyelo, and is filled with great hatred for Plekhanov and the "Plekhanovites." In its articles on the split in the Union of Russian Social-Democrats Abroad, the Nakanunye definitely sided with the Rabocheye Dyelo and poured a stream of abuse upon Plekhanov. All the more valuable, therefore, is this witness in the question at issue. In No. 7 of the Nakanunye (July 1899), in an article entitled "The Manifesto of the Self-Emancipation of the Workers Group," E. Serebryakov argues that it was "indecent" to talk about such things as "self-deception, leadership and so-called Areopagus in a serious revolutionary movement" and, among other things, wrote:

    "Myshkin, Rogachov, Zhelyabov, Mikhailov, Perovskaya, Figner and others never regarded themselves as leaders, and no one ever elected or appointed them as such, although as a matter of fact, they were leaders because, in the propaganda period, as well as in the period of the fight against the government, they took the brunt of the work upon themselves, they went into the most dangerous places and their activities were the most fruitful. They became leaders not because they wished it, but because the comrades surrounding them had confidence in their wisdom, their energy and loyalty. To be afraid of some kind of

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Areopagus (if it is not feared, why write about it?) that would arbitrarily govern the movement is far too naïve. Who would obey it?'!

    We ask the reader, in what way does "Areopagus" differ from "antidemocratic tendencies"? And is it not evident that the Rabocheye Dyelo's "plausible" organizational principle is equally naïve and indecent; naïve, because no one would obey "Areopagus," or people with "antidemocratic tendencies," if "the comrades surrounding them had" no "confidence in their wisdom, energy and loyalty"; indecent, because it is a demagogic sally calculated to play on the conceit of some, on the ignorance of others regarding the actual state of our movement, and on the lack of training and ignorance of the history of the revolutionary movement of still others. The only serious organizational principle for the active workers of our movement should be the strictest selection of members and the training of professlonal revolutionaries. Given these qualities, something even more than "democracy" would be guaranteed to us, namely, complete, comradely, mutual confidence among revolutionaries. And this is absolutely essential for us because there can be no question of replacing it by universal democratic control in Russia. And it would be a great mistake to believe that the fact that it is impossible to establish real "democratic" control renders the members of the revolutionary organization beyond control altogether. They have not the time to think about the toy forms of democracy (democracy within a close and compact body of comrades in which complete, mutual confidence prevails), but they have a lively sense of their responsibility, knowing as they do from experience that an organization of real revolutionaries will stop at nothing to rid itself of an undesirable member. Moreover, there is a fairly well-developed public opinion in

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Russian (and international) revolutionary circles which has a long history behind it, and which sternly and ruthlessly punishes every departure from the duties of comradeship (and "democracy," real and not toy democracy, certainly forms a component part of the conception of comradeship). Take all this into consideration and you will realize that all this talk and these resolutions about "antidemocratic tendencies" have the musty smell of that playing at generalship which is indulged in abroad.

    It must be observed also that the other source of this talk, i.e., naïveté, is likewise fostered by the confusion of ideas concerning the meaning of democracy. In Mr. and Mrs. Webb's book on the British trade unions there is an interesting chapter entitled "Primitive Democracy." In it the authors relate how the British workers, in the first period of existence of their unions, thought that it was an indispensable sign of democracy for all the members to do all the work of managing the unions; not only were all questions decided by the vote of all the members, but all the official duties were fulfilled by all the members in turn. A long period of historical experience was required for workers to realize how absurd such a conception of democracy was and to make them understand the necessity for representative institutions, on the one hand, and for full-time officials, on the other. Only after a number of cases of financial bankruptcy of trade unions occurred did the workers realize that the ratio between dues and benefits cannot be decided merely by a democratic vote, but requires also the advice of insurance experts. Take also Kautsky's book on parliamentarism and legislation by the people and you will see that the conclusions drawn by the Marxist theoretician coincide

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with the lessons learned from many years of practical experience by the workers who organized "spontaneously." Kautsky strongly protests against Rittinghausen's primitive conception of democracy; he ridicules those who in the name of democracy demand that "popular newspapers shall be directly edited by the people"; he shows the need for professional journalists, parliamentarians, etc., for the Social-Democratic leadership of the proletarian class struggle; he attacks the "Socialism of anarchists and litterateurs," who in their "striving after effect" extol direct legislation by the whole people, completely failing to understand that this idea can be only relatively applied in modern society.

    Those who have performed practical work in our movement know how widespread is the "primitive" conception of democracy among the masses of the students and workers. It is not surprising that this conception penetrates into rules of organization and into literature. The Economists of the Bernstein persuasion included in their rules the following: "§10. All affairs affecting the interests of the whole of the union organization shall be decided by a majority vote of all its members." The Economists of the terrorist persuasion repeat after them: "The decisions of the committee shall become effective only after they have been circulated among all the circles." (Svoboda, No. 1, p. 67.) Observe that this proposal for a widely applied referendum is advanced in addition to the demand that the whole of the organization be built on an elective basis! We would not, of course, on this account condemn practical workers who have had too few opportunities for studying the theory and practice of real democratic organizations. But when the Rabocheye Dyelo, which lays claim to leadership, confines itself, under such

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    The objections raised against the organization plan outlined here on the grounds that it is undemocratic and conspiratorial are totally unsound. Nevertheless, a question still remains which is frequently put and deserves detailed examination. This is the question about the relations between local work and all-Russian work. Fears are expressed that the formation of a centralized organization may shift the centre of gravity from the former to the latter, damage the movement, weaken our contacts with the masses of the workers and undermine local agitation generally. To these fears we reply that our movement in the past few years has suffered precisely from the fact that the local workers have been too absorbed in local work; that therefore it is absolutely necessary to shift the centre of gravity somewhat to national work and that far from weakening, this would strengthen our ties and the continuity of our local agitation. Take the question of central and local newspapers. I would ask the reader not to forget that we cite the publication of newspapers only as an example, illustrating an immeasurably broader and more varied revolutionary activity in general.

    In the first period of the mass movement (1896-98), an attempt is made by local Party workers to publish an all-Russian paper, the Rabochaya Gazeta. In the next period (1898-1900), the movement makes an enormous stride, but the attention of the leaders is wholly absorbed by local publications. If we count up all the local papers that were

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they would record the results of our experience in the trade union struggle, would preserve the material collected -- which now literally gets lost in a mass of leaflets and fragmentary correspondence -- and would generalize this material. Thirdly, they could serve as material for the guidance of agitators, because conditions of labour change relatively slowly and the principal demands of the workers in a given trade are extremely stable (cf., for example, the demands advanced by the weavers in the Moscow district in 1885 and in the St. Petersburg district in 1896); a compilation of these demands and needs might serve for years as an excellent handbook for agitators on economic questions in backward localities or among the backward strata of the workers. Examples of successful strikes, information about the higher standard of living, about better conditions of labour in one district, would encourage the workers in other districts to take up the fight again and again. Fourthly, having made a start in generalizing the trade union struggle, and having in this way strengthened the link between the Russian trade union movement and Socialism, the Social-Democrats would at the same time see to it that our trade union work did not take up either too small or too large a part of our entire Social-Democratic work. A local organization that is cut off from the organizations in other towns finds it very difficult, and sometimes almost impossible, to maintain a correct sense of proportion (and the example of the Rabochaya Mysl shows what a monstrous exaggeration can be made in the direction of trade unionism). But an all-Russian organization of revolutionaries that stands undeviatingly on the basis of Marxism, that leads the whole of the political struggle and possesses a staff of professional agitators, will never find it difficult to determine the proper proportion.

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    Let us quote a regular bouquet of the expletives and exclamations that the Rabocheye Dyelo hurled at us. "It is not a newspaper that can create a party organization, but just the other way round. . . ." "A newspaper, standing above the party, outside of its control, and independent of it, thanks to its having its own staff of agents. . . ." "By what miracle has the Iskra forgotten about the actually existing Social-Democratic organizations of the party to which it belongs?. . ." "Those who possess firm principles and a corresponding plan are the supreme regulators of the real struggle of the party and dictate to it their plan. . . ." "The

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plan drives our live and virile organizations into the realm of shadows and desires to call into being a fantastic network of agents. . . ." "If the Iskra's plan were carried out, every trace of the Russian Social-Democratic labour party, which is taking shape, would be completely wiped out. . . ." "A propagandist organ becomes an uncontrolled autocratic lawmaker for the entire practical revolutionary struggle. . . ." "How should our party react to the suggestion that it be completely subordinated to an autonomous editorial board?", etc., etc.

    As the reader can see from the contents and tone of the above quotations, the Rabocheye Dyelo has taken offence. Not for its own sake, but for the sake of the organizations and committees of our Party which it alleges the Iskra desires to drive into the realm of shadows and even obliterate their traces. Terrible, isn't it? But the curious thing is this. The article "Where To Begin?" appeared in May 1901. The articles in the Rabocheye Dyelo appeared in September 1901. Now we are in the middle of January 1901. During these five months (prior to and after September), not a single committee and not a single organization of the Party protested formally against this monster which desires to drive them into the realm of shadows; and yet scores and hundreds of communications from all parts of Russia have appeared during this period in the Iskra, and in numerous local and non-local publications. How could it happen that those who would be driven into the realm of shadows are not aware of it and have not taken offence, though a third party did take offence?

    The explanation is that the committees and other organizations are engaged in real work and do not play at "democracy." The committees read the article "Where To Begin?",

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saw that it was an attempt "to work out a definite plan for an organization which would make it possible to set about building that organization from all sides," and as they knew and saw very well that not one of these "sides" will dream of "setting to work to build it" until it is convinced of its necessity, and of the correctness of the architectural plan, it has naturally never occurred to them to take offence at the boldness of the people who said in the Iskra: "In view of the urgency and importance of the question, we make bold to submit to the comrades an outline of a plan which is developed in greater detail in a pamphlet now being prepared for the press." Assuming people were conscientious about the work, would they not understand that if the comrades accepted the plan submitted to them, they would carry it out, not because they are "subordinate" but because they would be convinced of its necessity for our common cause, and that if they did not accept it, then the "outline" (a pretentious word, is it not?) would remain merely an outline? Is it not sheer demagogy to fight against the outline of a plan, not only by "picking it to pieces" and advising comrades to reject it, but also by inciting people inexperienced in revolutionary activity against the authors of the outline merely on the grounds that they dare to "make laws" and come out as the "supreme regulators," i.e., because they dare to submit an outline of a plan? Can our Party develop and make progress if an attempt to raise local Party workers to broader views, tasks, plans, etc., is objected to, not only on the ground that these views are wrong, but on the grounds that the very "desire" to "raise" is "offensive"? L. Nadezhdin also "picked" our plan "to pieces," but he did not sink to such demagogy as cannot be explained by naïveté or by primitive political views. Right from the outset, he emphatically re-

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jected the charge that we intended to establish an "inspectorship over the Party." That is why Nadezhdin's criticism of the plan can and should be answered on its merits, while the Rabocheye Dyelo deserves only to be treated with contempt.

    The main point of the article "Where To Begin?" is that it discusses precisely this question and gives an affirmative reply to it. As far as we know, the only attempt to examine this question on its merits and to prove that it must be answered in the negative was made by L. Nadezhdin, whose argument we reproduce in full:

    ". . . It greatly pleased us to see the Iskra (No. 4) raise the question of the need for an all-Russian newspaper, but we cannot agree that it fits in with the title of the article: 'Where To Begin?' Undoubtedly this is an extremely important matter, but neither a newspaper, nor a whole series of popular leaflets, nor a whole mountain of manifestoes, can serve as the basis for a militant organization in revolutionary times. We must set to work to build up strong political organizations in the localities. We lack such organizations; we have been carrying on our work mainly among enlightened workers, while the masses have been engaged almost exclusively in the economic struggle. If strong political organizations are not trained locally, what will be the use of even an excellently organized all-Russian newspaper? It will be a burning bush, burning without being consumed, but firing no one! The Iskra thinks that around it, in the work for it people will gather and organize. But they will find it far easier to gather and organize around work that is more concrete! This something

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more concrete must and should be the extensive organization of local newspapers, the immediate preparation of the workers' forces for demonstrations, constant work by local organizations among the unemployed (regular distriblltion of pamphlets and leaflets, meetings, appeals to resist the government, etc.). We must begin live political work in the localities, and when the time comes to amalgamate on this real basis, it will not be an artificial, a paper amalgamation, it will not be by means of newspapers that such an amalgamation of local work into an all-Russian cause will be achieved!" (The Eve of Revolution, p. 54.)

    We have emphasized the passages in this eloquent tirade which most strikingly illustrate the author's incorrect judgment of our plan, and the incorrectness of his point of view in general, which he opposes to that of the Iskra. Unless we train strong political organizations in the localities -- even an excellently organized all-Russian newspaper will be of no avail. Absolutely true. But the whole point is that there is no other way of t r a i n i n g strong political organizations except through the medium of an all-Russian newspaper. The author missed the most important statement the Iskra made before it proceeded to set forth its "p]an": that it was necessary "to call for the establishment of a revolutionary organization, capable of combining all the forces and of leading the movement not only in name, but in deed, i.e., an organization that will be ready at any moment to support every protest and every outbreak, and to utilize these for the purpose of increasing and strengthening the military forces required for decisive battle." But now after the February and March events, everyone will agree with this in principle, continues the Iskra. Yet what we need is not a solution of the problem in principle, but a practical solution of it; we must immediately advance a definite constructive plan in order that everyone may immediately set to work to build from every side. And now we are again being dragged

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away from the practical solution towards something that in principle is correct, indisputable and great, but is absolutely inadequate and absolutely incomprehensible to the broad masses of workers, namely, to "train strong political organizations"! This is not the point at issue, most worthy author! The point is how to go about the training and how to accomplish it!

    It is not true to say that "we have been carrying on our work mainly among enlightened workers, while the masses have been engaged almost exclusively in the economic struggle." Presented in such a form, this thesis reduces itself to the Svoboda's usual but fundamentally fallacious proclivity to oppose the enlightened workers to the "mass." In recent years, even the enlightened workers have been "engaged almost exclusively in the economic struggle." That is the first point. On the other hand, the masses will never learn to conduct the political struggle until we help to train leaders for this struggle, both from among the enlightened workers and from among the intellectuals; and such leaders can acquire training solely by systematically appraising all the everyday aspects of our political life, of all attempts at protest and struggle on the part of various classes and on various grounds. Therefore, to talk about "training political organizations" and at the same time to contrast the "paper work" of a political newspaper to "live political work in the localities" is simply ridiculousl Why, the Iskra has adapted its "plan" for a newspaper to the "plan" for creating a "militant preparedness" to support the unemployed movement, peasant revolts, discontent among the Zemstvo-ites, "popular indignation against the reckless tsarist bashi-bazouks," etc. Everyone who is at all acquainted with the movement knows perfectly well that the vast majority of

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local organizations never even dream of these things, that many of the prospects of "live political work" here indicated have never been realized by a single organization, that the attempt, for example, to call attention to the growth of discontent and protest among the Zemstvo intelligentsia rouses feelings of consternation and perplexity in Nadezhdin ("Good Lord, is this newspaper intended for Zemstvo-ites?" -- The Eve, p. 129), among the Economists (letter to the Iskra No. 12) and among many practical workers. Under these circumstances, it is possible to "begin" only by inducing people to think about all these things, by inducing them to summarize and generalize all the diverse signs of ferment and active struggle. "Live political work" can be begun in our time, when Social-Democratic tasks are being degraded exclusively with live political agitation, which is impossible unless we have an all-Russian newspaper, frequently issued and properly distributed.

    Those who regard the Iskra's "plan" as a manifestation of "literariness" have totally failed to understand the substance of the plan, and imagine that what is suggested as the most suitable means for the present time is the goal. These people have not taken the trouble to study the two comparisons that were drawn to clearly illustrate the plan proposed. The Iskra wrote: the publication of an all-Russian political newspaper must be the main line by adhering to which we could unswervingly develop deeper, and expand this organization (i.e., a revolutionary organization always prepared to support every protest and every outbreak). Pray tell me: when bricklayers lay bricks in various parts of an enormous structure the like of which has never been seen before, is it "paper" work to use a line to help them find the correct place in which to put each brick, to indicate to

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them the ultimate purpose of the work as a whole, enable them to use not only every brick but even every piece of brick which, joining with the bricks placed before and after it, forms a complete and all-embracing line? And are we not now passing through just such a period in our Party life when we have bricks and bricklayers, but lack the guiding line which all could see and follow? Let them shout that in stretching out the line, we want to command. Had we desired to command, gentlemen, we would have written on the title page, not "Iskra, No. 1," but "Rabochaya Gazeta, No. 3," as we were invited to do by a number of comrades, and as we would have had a perfect right to do after the events described above. But we did not do that. We wished to have our hands free to wage an irreconcilable struggle against all pseudo Social-Democrats; we wanted our line, if properly laid, to be respected because it was correct, and not because it was laid by an official organ.

    "The question of uniting local activity in central bodies runs in a vicious circle," L. Nadezhdin lectures us; "unifica tion requires homogeneous elements, and this can be created only by something that unites; but this uniting element may be the product of strong local organizations which at the present time are by no means distinguished for their homo geneity." This truism is as hoary and indisputable as the one that says we must train strong political organizations. And it is equally barren. Every question "runs in a vicious circle" because the whole of political life is an endless chain consisting of an infinite number of links. The whole art of politics lies in finding and gripping as strong as we can the link that is least likely to be torn out of our hands, the one that is most important at the given moment, the one that guarantees the possessor of a link the possession of the

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organizations, experience shows that sometimes they may be built without scaffolding -- take the 'seventies for example. But at the present time we cannot imagine that the building we require can be put up without scaffolding.

    Nadezhdin disagrees with this, and says: "The Iskra thinks that around it, in the work for it people will gather and organize. But they will find it far easier to gather and organize around work that is more concrete !" So! So! "they will hnd it far easier to gather around work that is more concrete. . . ." There is a Russian proverb which says: "Don't spit into a well, you may want to drink out of it." But there are people who do not object to drinking from a well which has been spat into. What despicable things our magnificent, legal "critics of Marxism" and illegal admirers of the Rabochaya Mysl have said in the name of this something more concretet How restricted our movement is by our own narrowness, lack of initiative and hesitation, which is justified by the traditional argument about finding it "far easier to gather around work that is more concrete"! And Nadezhdin -- who regards himself as possessing a particularly keen sense of the "realities of life," who so severely condemns "armchair" authors (with pretensions to being witty) and accuses the Iskra of a weakness for seeing Economism everywhere, and who imagines that he stands far above this division between the orthodox and the critics -- fails to see that with his arguments he is playing into the hands of the narrowness that arouses his indignation and that he is drinking from a well that has actually been spat into! Yes, the sincerest indignation against narrowness, the most passionate desire to raise those who worship this narrowness from their knees, is insufficient if the indignant one is swept along without sail or rudder, and as "spontaneously" as the revolu-

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tionaries of the 'seventies, clutches at such things as "excitative terror," "agrarian terror," "sounding the tocsin," etc. Glance at this "more concrete" work around which he thinks it will be "far easier" to gather and organize: 1) local newspapers; 2) preparations for demonstrations; 3) work among the unemployed. It will be seen at the very first glance that all these have been seized upon at random in order to be able to say something, for however we may regard them, it would be absurd to see in them anything especially suitable for "gathering and organizing." Why, this very Nadezhdin says a few pages further on: "It is time we simply stated the fact that extremely petty work is being carried on in the localities, the committees are not doing a tenth of what they could do . . . the unifying centres that we have at the present time are a pure fiction, they represent a sort of revolutionary bureaucracy, mutual promotion of each other to the post of general; and so it will continue until strong local organizations grow up." These remarks, though exaggerating the position somewhat, no doubt contain many a bitter truth, but can it be said that Nadezhdin does not see the connection between the petty work carried on in the localities and the narrow outlook of the Party workers, the narrow scope of their activities, which is inevitable in view of the lack of training of the Party workers confined to their local organizations? Has he, like the author of the article on organization published in the Svoboda, forgotten how the transition to a broad local press (from 1898) was accompanied by a very strong intensification of Economism and "amateurishness" ? Even if a "broad local press" could be established at all satisfactorily (and we have shown above that it is impossible save in very exceptional cases) -- even then the local organs could not "gather and organize" all

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the revolutionary forces for a general attack upon the autocracy and for the leadership of a united struggle. Do not forget that we are here discussing only the "gathering," the organizing significance of a newspaper, and we could put to Nadezhdin, who defends scatteredness, the ironical question that he himself has put: "Has someone left us a legacy of 200,000 revolutionary organizers?" Furthermore, "preparations for demonstrations" cannot be opposed to the Iskra's plan for the very reason that this plan includes the organization of the widest possible demonstrations as one of its aims; the point under discussion is the choice of the practical means. On this point also Nadezhdin is confused for he has lost sight of the fact that only already "gathered and organized" forces can "prepare for" demonstrations (which hitherto, in the overwhelming majority of cases, have taken place quite spontaneously) and we lack precisely the ability to gather and organize. "Work among the unemployed." Again the same confusion, for this too represents one of the military operations of the mobilized forces and not a plan for mobilizing the forces. The extent to which Nadezhdin here too underestimates the harm caused by our state of scatteredness, by our lack of "200,000 organizers," can be seen from the following: many (including Nadezhdin) have reproached the Iskra with the paucity of the news it gives about unemployment and with the casual nature of the correspondence it publishes about the most common affairs of rural life. The reproach is justified, but the Iskra's "guilty without sin." We strive "to stretch a line" through the countryside too, but there are almost no bricklayers there, and we are obliged to encourage everyone who informs us even on the most common facts, in the hope that this will increase the number of our contributors in this field and will

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ultimately train us all to select the really most outstanding facts. But the material on which we can train is so scanty that unless we generalize it for the whole of Russia we shall have very little to train on at all. No doubt one who possesses at least as much capability as an agitator and as much knowledge of the life of the vagrant as apparently Nadezhdin does, could render priceless service to the movement by carrying on agitation among the unemployed -- but a person of this description would be simply burying his talents if he failed to inform all comrades in Russia of every step he took in his work, in order that others, who, in the mass, as yet lack the ability to undertake new kinds of work, might learn from his example.

    Absolutely everybody now talks about the importance of unity, about the necessity for "gathering and organizing" but in the majority of cases what is lacking is a definite idea of where to begin and how to bring about this unity. Probably everyone will agree that if we "unite," say, the district circles in a given city? it will be necessary to have for this purpose common institutions, i.e., not merely a common title of "Union" but genuinely common work exchange of material, experience and forces, distribution of functions not only by districts, but specializing them on a city-wide scale. Everyone will agree that a big secret apparatus will not pay its way (to use a commercial expression) "with the resources" (in material and man power, of course), of a single district, and that this narrow field will not provide sufficient scope for a specialist to develop his talents. But the same thing applies to the unification of a number of cities, because even a whole locality will prove, and has already proved in the history of our Social-Democratic movement, to be far too narrow a field: we have already proved this above in detail

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with regard to political agitation and organizational work. What we require first and foremost and most imperatively, is to widen the field, establish real contacts between the cities on the basis of regular, common work; for scatteredness weighs down our people who are "stuck in a hole" (to use the expression employed by a correspondent to the Iskra ), not knowing what is happening in the world, from whom to learn, or how to acquire experience and satisfy their desire to engage in broad activities. And I continue to insist that we can start establishing real contacts only with the aid of a common newspaper, as the only regular, all-Russian enterprise, which will summarize the results of the most diverse forms of activity and thereby stimulate people to march forward untiringly along all the innumerable paths which lead to revolution in the same way as all roads lead to Rome. If it is not in name only that we want unity, we must arrange for every local circle immediately to assign, say, a fourth of its forces to active work for the common cause and the newspaper will immediately convey to them* the general design, dimensions and character of this cause, will give them a precise indication of the most keenly felt defects of all-Russian activity, where agitation is lacking and where contacts are weak, and point out which cogs in the vast general mechanism could be repaired or replaced by better ones. A circle that has not yet commenced to work, but which is only just seeking work, could then start, not

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like a craftsman in a separate little workshop unaware of the development that has taken place in "industry" before him or of the general level of production methods prevailing in industry, but as a participant in an extensive enterprise that reflects the whole general revolutionary attack on the autocracy. And the more perfect the finish of each cog, the larger the number of detail workers engaged in the common cause, the closer will our network become and the less will be the consternation in the general ranks resulting from inevitable police raids.

    Actual contacts would begin to be established by the mere function of distributing a newspaper (that is, if it is a newspaper worthy of the name, i.e., if it is issued regularly, not once a month like a magazine, but four times a month). At the present time, communication between cities on revolutionary business is an extreme rarity, and at all events the exception rather than the rule. If we had a newspaper, however, such communication would become the rule and would secure, not only the distribution of the newspaper, of course, but also (and what is more important) an exchange of experience, of material, of forces and of resources. The scope of organizational work would immediately become many times wider and the success of one locality would serve as a standing encouragement to further perfection and would arouse the desire to utilize the experience already gained by comrades working in other parts of the country. Local work would become far richer and more varied than it is now: political and economic exposures gathered from all over Russia would provide mental food for workers of all trades and in all stages of development, would provide material and occasion for talks and readings on the most diverse subjects, which would, in addition, be suggested by

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hints in the legal press, by talk among the public and by the "shamefaced" government statements. Every outbreak, every demonstration, would be weighed and discussed in all its aspects in all parts of Russia; it would stimulate a desire to keep up with the rest (we Socialists do not by any means reject all rivalry or all "competition"!) and consciously to prepare for that which at first appeared spontaneously as it were, a desire to take advantage of the favourable conditions in a given district or at a given moment for modifying the plan of attack, etc. At the same time, this revival of local work would not result in that desperate, "convulsive" exertion of all efforts and the risking of all forces which every single demonstration or the publication of every single issue of a local newspaper now frequently entails. On the one hand the police would find it much more difficult to get at the "roots," once they do not know in what district to seek for them. On the other hand, regular common work would train our people to adjust the force of a given attack to the strength of the given detachment of the army (at the present time no one ever thinks of doing that, because in nine cases out of ten these attacks occur spontaneously), and would facilitate the "transportation" from one place to another, not only of literature, but also of revolutionary forces.

    At present these forces in a great many cases are being spent and bled on restricted local work, but under the circumstances we are discussing, there would be the possibility and occasion would constantly arise for transferring an agitator or organizer who is at all capable from one end of the country to another. Beginning with short journeys on Party business at the Party's expense, people would become accustomed to being maintained entirely by the Party, would

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become professional revolutionaries and would train themselves to be real political leaders.

    And if indeed we succeeded in reaching a point when all, or at least a considerable majority, of the local committees, local groups and circles actively took up work for the common cause, we could, in the not distant future, establish a weekly newspaper that would be regularly distributed in tens of thousands of copies over the whole of Russia. This newspaper would become a part of an enormous pair of smith's bellows that would fan every spark of class struggle and popular indignation into a general conflagration. Around what is in itself still a very innocent and very small, but a regular and common effort, in the full sense of the word, a regular army of tried warriors would systematically gather and receive their training. On the ladders and scaffolding of this general organizational structure there would soon develop and come to the fore Social-Democratic Zhelyabovs from among our revolutionaries and Russian Bebels from among our workers who would take their place at the head of the mobilized army and rouse the whole people to settle accounts with the shame and the curse of Russia.

    That is what we should dream of.

*                     *                      *

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Comrade Krichevsky who (philosophically deepening Comrade Martynov who had long ago rendered Comrade Plekhanov more profound) continues even more sternly: "I go further. I ask, has a Marxist any right at all to dream, knowing that according to Marx mankind always sets itself such tasks as it can solve and that tactics is a process of growth of Party tasks, which grow together with the Party?"

    The very thought of these stern questions sends a cold shiver down my spine and makes me wish for nothing but a place to hide. I shall try to hide behind the back of Pisarev.

    From what has been said the reader will see that our "tactics-as-a-plan" consists in rejecting an immediate call for attack, in demanding "a regular siege of the enemy fortress," or in other words, in demanding that all efforts be directed towards gathering, organizing and mobilizing permanent troops. When we ridiculed the Rabocheye Dyelo for its leap from Economism to shouting for an attack (for which it clamoured in April 1901, in the Listok Rabochevo Dyela, No. 6), it of course came down on us with accusations of being "doctrinaire," of failing to understand our revolutionary duty, of calling for caution, etc. Of course we were not in the least surprised to hear these accusations coming from those who totally lack principles and who evade all arguments by references to a profound "tactics-as-a-process," any more than we were surprised by the fact that these accusations were repeated by Nadezhdin, who in general has a supreme contempt for durable programs and the fundamentals of tactics.

    It is said that history does not repeat itself. But Nadezhdin is exerting every effort to cause it to repeat itself and he zealously imitates Tkachov in strongly condemning "revolutionary culturism," in shouting about "sounding the tocsin,"

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you think it would have been more becoming for "the eve-of-the-revolution point of view" to have issued 132,000 leaflets containing the brief call: "Beat them up"?

    Those who make nation-wide political agitation the cornerstone of their program, their tactics and their organizational work as the Iskra does, stand in least risk of missing the revolution. The people who were engaged over the whole of Russia in spinning the network of organizations linked up with an all-Russian newspaper not only did not miss the spring events, but, on the contrary, enabled us to foretell them. Nor did they miss the demonstrations that were described in the Iskra, Nos. 13 and 14; on the contrary, they took part in those demonstrations, clearly appreciating their duty of coming to the aid of the spontaneously rising crowd and, at the same time, through the medium of the newspaper, helping all the comrades in Russia to become more closely acquainted with the demonstrations and to utilize their experience. And if they live they will not miss the revolution which first and foremost will demand of us experience in agitation, ability to support (in a Social-Democratic manner) every protest, ability to direct the spontaneous movement, while safeguarding it from the mistakes of friends and the traps of enemies!

    We have thus come to the last reason that compels us so strongly to insist upon a plan of organization centred around an all-Russian newspaper, by means of joint work for a common newspaper. Only such organization will ensure the flexibility required of a militant Social-Democratic organization, i.e., the ability to adapt itself immediately to the most diverse and rapidly changing conditions of struggle, the ability, "on the one hand, to avoid open battle with an enemy of overwhelming strength when he has concentrated

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the focus of this activity, should be work that is possible and necessary in the period of the most powerful outbreaks as well as in the period of complete calm, namely, work of political agitation, linked up over the whole of Russia, illuminating all aspects of life and conducted among the broadest possible strata of the masses. But this work is unthinkable in contemporary Russia without an all-Russian newspaper, issued very frequently. The organization which will form around this newspaper, an organization of its collaborators (in the broad sense of the word, i.e., all those working for it), will be ready for everything, from upholding the honour, the prestige and continuity of the Party in periods of acute revolutionary "depression," to preparing for, fixing the time for and carrying out the nation-wide armed insurrection.

    Indeed, picture to yourselves a very ordinary occurrence in Russia -- the complete discovery and arrest of our organization in one or several localities. With all the local organizations lacking a single, common regular task, such raids frequently result in the interruption of our work for many months. If, however, all the local organizations had one common task, then, even in the event of a very serious raid, two or three energetic persons could in the course of a few weeks establish new youth circles, which, as is well known, spring up very quickly even now, and bring them into contact with the common centre. And when the common task, hampered by the raid, is apparent to all, new circles could come into being and make connections with the centre even more rapidly.

    On the other hand, picture to yourselves a popular uprising. Probably everyone will now agree that we must think of this and prepare for it. But how? Surely the Central Committee cannot appoint agents to all localities for the

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of the whole of the people to the conduct of the government. And lastly, it is precisely such work that would train all revolutionary organizations throughout Russia to maintain the most continuous, and at the same time the most secret, contact with each other, thus creating real Party unity -- for without such contacts it will be impossible collectively to discuss the plan of the uprising and take the necessary preparatory measures on the eve of it, which must be kept in the strictest secrecy.

    In a word, the "plan for an all-Russian political newspaper," far from representing the fruits of the labour of armchair workers, infected with dogmatism and literariness (as it seemed to those who gave but little thought to it), is a most practical plan for immediate and all-round preparations for the uprising, while at the same time never for a moment forgetting our ordinary, everyday work.

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    The history of Russian Social-Democracy can be distinctly divided into three periods:

    The first period covers about ten years, approximately the years 1884 to 1894. This was the period of the rise and consolidation of the theory and program of Social-Democracy. The number of adherents of the new trend in Russia could be counted in units. Social-Democracy existed without a working-class movement; as a political party it was undergoing a process of foetal development.

    The second period covers three or four years -- 1894-98. In this period Social-Democracy appeared on the scene as a social movement, as the upsurge of the masses of the people, as a political party. This is the period of its childhood and adolescence. With the speed of an epidemic there spread among the intelligentsia a universal passion to fight Narodism and go among the workers; a universal passion among the workers for strike action. The movement made enormous strides. The majority of the leaders were quite young people who had by no means reached "the age of thirty-five" which to Mr. N. Mikhailovsky appeared to be

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a sort of natural border line. Owing to their youth, they proved to be untrained for practical work and they left the scene with astonishing rapidity. But in the majority of cases the scope of their work was very wide. Many of them began their revolutionary thinking as adherents of Narodnaya Volya. Nearly all of them in their early youth enthusiastically worshipped the terrorist heroes. It required a struggle to abandon the captivating impressions of these heroic traditions, and it was accompanied by the break of personal relations with people who were determined to remain loyal to the Narodnaya Volya and for whom the young Social-Democrats had profound respect. The struggle compelled them to educate themselves, to read the illegal literature of diverse tendencies and to study closely the questions of legal Narodism. Trained in this struggle, Social-Democrats went into the working-class movement without "for a moment" forgetting the theory of Marxism which brightly illuminated their path, or the task of overthrowing the autocracy. The formation of the Party in the spring of 1898 was the most striking and at the same time the last act of the Social-Democrats of this period.

    The third period, as we have seen, was prepared in 1897 and definitely replaced the second period in 1898 (1898-?). This was a period of disunity, dissolution and vacillation. In the period of adolescence a youth's voice breaks. And so, in this period, the voice of Russian Social-Democracy began to break, began to strike a false note -- on the one hand, in the productions of Messrs. Struve and Prokopovich, Bulgakov and Berdyaev, and on the other hand, in the productions of V. I-n and R. M., B. Krichevsky and Martynov. But it was only the leaders who wandered

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about separately and went back; the movement itself continued to grow, and advanced with enormous strides. The proletarian struggle spread to new strata of the workers, extended to the whole of Russia and at the same time indirectly stimulated the revival of the democratic spirit among the students and among other strata of the population. The consciousness of the leaders, however, failed to face up to the breadth and power of the spontaneous upsurge; among Social-Democrats, a different brand predominated -- a brand of Party workers who had been trained almost exclusively on "legal Marxist" literature which proved to be all the more inadequate the more the spontaneity of the masses called for consciousness. The leaders not only lagged behind in regard to theory ("freedom of criticism") and practice ("amateurishness"), but tried to justify their backwardness by all sorts of high-flown arguments. Social-Democracy was degraded to the level of trade unionism by the Brentano-ites in legal literature, and by the tail-enders in illegal literature. The Credo program began to be put into operation, especially when the "amateurishness" of the Social-Democrats caused a revival of revolutionary non-Social-Democratic tendencies.

    And if the reader reproaches me for having dealt in excessive detail with a certain Rabocheye Dyelo, I shall say to him in reply: the Rabocheye Dyelo acquired "historical" significance because it most strikingly reflected the "spirit" of this third period.* It was not the consistent R.M. but

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the weathercock Krichevskys and Martynovs who could properly express the disunity and vacillation, the readiness to make concessions to "criticism," to "Economism" and to terrorism. It is not the lofty contempt for practical work displayed by some worshipper of the "absolute" that is characteristic of this period, but the combination of pettyfogging practice and utter disregard for theory. It was not so much the downright rejection of "great watchwords" that the heroes of this period engaged in as in their vulgarization: scientific Socialism ceased to be an integral revolutionary theory and became a hodgepodge "freely" diluted with the contents of every new German textbook that appeared; the slogan "class struggle" did not impel them forward to wider and more strenuous activity but served as a soothing syrup, because the "economic struggle is inseparably linked up with the political struggle"; the idea of a party did not serve as a call for the creation of a militant organization of revolutionaries, but was used to justify some sort of a "revolutionary bureaucracy" and infantile playing at "democratic" forms.

    When this third period will come to an end and the fourth begin we do not know (at all events it is already heralded by many signs). We are passing from the sphere of history to the sphere of the present and, partly, of the future. But we firmly believe that the fourth period will lead to the consolidation of militant Marxism, that Russian Social-Democracy will emerge from the crisis in the full strength of manhood, that the opportunist rearguard will be "replaced" by the genuine vanguard of the most revolutionary class.

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    In the sense of calling for such a "replacement" and summing up, as it were, all that has been expounded above, we may give the following brief reply to the question, What is to be done?:

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